SECRET

22 October 1948

TO : CIC

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT: Gen. Andre[illegible]hy and the Kopjar Organization.

1. We have a [illegible] information in our files on activities of the Hungarian emigre, and are able to provide some background information on General [illegible]hy and the Kopjar organization mentioned in the above memo, dated 15[illegible]. The group, like many of the Hungarian emigre groups, has been characterized by a considerable degree of security penetration by intelligence services (in this case, particularly the FIS), and a distinct pro-West political flavor.

2. The Kopjar group was first organized as a military unit by the Hungarian General Staff in the winter of 1944, trained in espionage and sabotage activities, and sent by its officers to continue resistance against the Communists and Soviets after the armistice. It appears that most of the leading members were eventually forced to flee Hungary. CIC reports in late 1947 indicated that the activities of the group were centered around DP camp Salzburg, in the British Zone of Austria. The leader of the group was at that time said to be [illegible]. CIC claims that this group was in touch with 35,000 Hungarians throughout Europe, and the [illegible] activities that he was actively in touch with no more than 100 former Hungarian army intelligence officers.

3. There is ample evidence that many leading members of the group were active in attempting to solicit the support of various Allied intelligence services.

a. It was first reported that one [illegible], who was representing the group in the US Zone of Austria, was actively in touch with Americans who were acting for the US, but that he was also then providing information to the CIC.

b. In May 1947, we learned from [illegible] sources that General [illegible] had made a secret [illegible] to Paris on the Diplomatic Passport of his group, in an attempt to secure US support for the organization. [illegible] had previously travelled to the US in March 1946 to try to persuade someone in the Truman Administration in this regard. [illegible] in Paris began to have been entangled in long negotiations with representatives of the FIS during the Spring of 1947.

c. [illegible] is known to have moved to the French Zone of Austria and to have lived there under the probable sponsorship of the FIS.

[illegible]

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DATE 2006

[redacted] Rose Burns [redacted] and the [redacted] organization.

d. In March 1945, [redacted] appeared at the US Consulate in Lisbon in the company of Gen. [redacted] and was interviewed by members of our station. He admitted no connection with the FIS, but stated he would prefer to wait for us. He submitted extensive articles of his career in which his intelligence activities regarding Hungary were being worked on, and also gave an outline of the sort of work which he would like to carry on for us. He furnished this until a detailed series of reports and tables of organization for proposed intelligence network into Hungary.

e. As recently as August 1945, [redacted] was in contact with agents engaged in Paris, one of his informants to [redacted] was elected of Hungarian radio broadcasts.

f. In a talk with Murray in July 1945, [redacted] X admitted that the Perlas group consisted of a large number of [redacted], etc., and that they were "the core of Hungary." But he admitted that they probably numbered about 1,000 exchange in army officers, and that they undoubtedly did still [redacted] underground roads out of Hungary. Outside this he, himself, his Excellency at the time, was employed out of Hungary by members of the Hungarian.

g. We have had other indications that [redacted] has been actively in contact with Gen. Ferenc [redacted], reading one of the less nasty emigre factions among the Hungarian refugees, and he has been the leading Social Democrat in the case of "playing cabinet" in the US. He broke up a complete government-in-exile set, and reportedly had forced his supporters to swear an oath of allegiance to him. Unfortunately, the Hon. General [redacted] could be persuaded to avoid Fabian, the better man would be glad to take care of him.

h. It can be seen from the above, the activities of the [redacted] organization have not been characterized by complete discretion. The security of all of the leading Hungarians has been notably bad, and there seems to be no exception in the case of [redacted] and the [redacted]. [redacted] has, however, evidently been considered an intelligent and eloquent man among the others, and [redacted] has considered using him for gathering positive intelligence from Hungary.

[redacted]